Author June M. Grasso, an assistant professor at Boston University, weaves a tale of bureaucratic intrigue around President Truman's efforts to forge a coherent China policy in the immediate post-war era that would permit the U.S. to deal effectively with both the Communist leadership on the mainland and the Nationalists on Taiwan. Grasso has drawn heavily on new information made available by the Freedom of Information Act, probing into government files from the 1940s and early 1950s.
Grasso's major theme challenges the idea that Truman executed a quick about-face in his policy toward Taiwan when the Korean War broke out just a year after Mao Tse-tung declared the founding of the "People's Republic of China" on the Chinese mainland. She presents documented evidence of a secret effort to divert China aid funds to Taiwan (with the knowledge and agreement of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek) during 1948-1949.
The accepted view to date has been that Truman willfully abandoned the Nationalists in mid-1949, formally sealing the decision with his January 5, 1950 declaration of disengagement from further support for Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government on Taiwan. The accepted analysis also holds that Truman changed his mind six months later, when the Korean War broke out and Taiwan was included in the U.S. strategic plan for an "island chain defense perimeter" in the Western Pacific.
Grasso provides useful new information about the factors which lead to Truman's decision to adopt a "two-China" policy in 1949-1950. She argues that Truman was trapped into a posture of support for the Nationalists because of the Chinese Communists' maltreatment of U.S. diplomats shortly after they seized power in October 1949. The Chinese Communists held American consular officials in Mukden hostage for a year, a hostile act that made it impossible for Truman to recognize Mao's regime.
As for the Communists, they contended that smooth relations with the U.S. were impossible until it abandoned all support for the Nationalists on Taiwan. But Truman was not about to drop the "Taiwan card" as long as Americans were being held hostage in Mukden. Had the Mukden incident not occurred, Grasso argues, the U.S. may well have given in to pressure from European allies to recognize Mao's government earlier—even as soon as the end of 1949 or early in 1950, when England and other European powers recognized the mainland regime.
While this issue seemed to create conditions sufficiently unfavorable to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, the outbreak of the Korean War further stalled any moves toward recognition because of Peking's support for the North Korean invasion. But Grasso argues that Truman in fact had a "two-China" policy—or at least a "one China, one Taiwan" policy—in mind all along.
This assessment of Truman's intentions is based in part on how U.S. aid to the Nationalists was handled during 1948-1949, with special reference to the secret diversion of some funds allocated in the China Aid Act of April 1948 to Taiwan, which was done without the knowledge of the highest-ranking State Department representatives on the island. The goal, Grasso says, was to nurture Taiwan in a way that would keep it separate from Communist China, with or without Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.
Grasso's research further substantiates the view that the U.S. foreign policy and military establishments were seriously divided over the question of aiding the Nationalists, and deciding whether or not Taiwan was important to U.S. strategic interests. Grasso notes that President Truman was not personally fond of Chiang Kai-shek, and neither were many people in the State Department, especially George Marshall, who argued forcefully on several occasions that Chiang was a liability and should be abandoned.
Meanwhile, the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently supported the Nationalist retention of Taiwan because of U.S. strategic interests, particularly the island chain of defense theory. In support of this analysis, General Douglas MacArthur told Truman that the "domination of Taiwan by an unfriendly foreign power would be a disaster of utmost importance to the U.S."
The President was apparently convinced that this was true, but he nevertheless decided to tread carefully on the matter of covert support for the Nationalists—so much so that he took several steps to give the appearance of cutting back support of them. One such step was the issuance of the White Paper on China, in which the administration and the State Department argued ending support for Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. That now discredited report placed the blame for losing mainland China to the Communists squarely on the Nationalists.
Grasso's thesis is weakened due to insufficient evidence about the degree of Truman's actual involvement in China policymaking or his personal ideas about China. Much of what Truman might have believed about the issues remains shrouded in a cloud of bureaucratic competition and divided loyalties, and the information presented in this book does not clear the air sufficiently. For instance, was Truman only concerned about Taiwan's strategic importance, or did he also consider the wishes of the people on Taiwan? Did he think that Taiwan should be a U.S. protectorate, an independent state, or what?
And while the author indicates at the beginning of the book that the heretofore unpublished documents on Truman's China policy should have important implications for current China policy, these are not presented.
But there is much to learn from Grasso's research. Several sideline is sues of the period are clearly presented, including details about U.S.-U.K. relations, the Soviet Union's early intentions toward Mao's regime, and the U.N. de-liberations over the China seat on the Security Council.
For example, Grasso uncovers evidence showing that Washington and London were at great odds over Truman's continued support, covert or otherwise, for the Nationalists on Taiwan. Primarily for commercial reasons, the U.K. sought to keep a foothold in mainland China after Mao's takeover. While Truman was well aware of this orientation, the Mukden hostages tied his hands on the matter of recognition. The British leadership, Grasso says, went back on their word and surprised the U.S. by recognizing the Peking leadership on January 6, 1950. The action was interpreted as a major blow to U.S. efforts to isolate the Chinese Communists. Later, when the Korean War first broke out, Washington and London were again divided on the issue of condemning Peking.
But Grasso does not reject the British position on China out of hand; in fact, she holds throughout her discussion of the diplomatic row between Washington and London over China policy that the U.K.'s policies toward Mao's regime were actually more enlightened than those held by the U.S.
The author also gives insights into the Soviet Union's position on U.N. recognition of Communist China. Contrary to the accepted idea that Moscow wholeheartedly supported Communist China's entry into the organization, Grasso argues that the Soviet Union wanted to make sure the West and Communist China would remain divided. Accordingly, the Soviet Union instead attempted to stimulate opposition in the West toward Peking's entry into the U.N., thereby trying to maneuver Peking closer to the Soviet orbit. If accurate, it was a gambit that in fact paid off initially in terms of Moscow-Peking relations.
Grasso's analysis of how the Korean conflict became entangled with the Taiwan issue in the U.N. is especially clear. First, the U.N. denunciation of Peking's aid to North Korea helped solidify Truman's "two-China" policy. Second, the issue of the China seat made support for Security Council resolutions on the Korean conflict possible. The U.S. worked hard to keep the Nationalists on the Security Council because they represented the seventh and deciding vote on the resolution to commit U.N. forces to the defense of South Korea. Thus, Grasso argues, the U.N. situation helped lend support to Truman's otherwise perplexing insistence on supporting the Nationalists on Taiwan.
For students of Chinese affairs, Truman's Two-China Policy resurrects much of the old controversy over "who lost China" and "to whom Taiwan belongs." But more importantly, it sheds light on the complex divisions on China policy among the Truman administration, the American foreign policy establishment, the military, the Congress, and the American public in the post-war era. While there are still lingering questions about the issues covered in Grasso's balanced account of Sino-American relations, she is successful in stimulating a reevaluation of one of modern history's most complex periods.